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PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXCAVATION: 
SEARCHING FOR THE IRREDUCIBLE 
GROUND OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE 
BY 
James Alan Tuedio 
"It seemed to him (that) 
he was looking in through 
a lighted window at a life 
which he had always known, 
but which he could never 
make his own." 
—Thomas Wolfe 
Is suspension in non-reflective awareness non-personal 
consciousness? What accounts for the unity of non-posi-
tional consciousness? What is it at the heart of non-
reflective, non-positional engagement in immediacy that 
makes the experience my_ experience? Can it even be said 
to be mine? 
Take as an example the intense reading of a novel. 
When plunged into the consciousness of book-being-read, 
I am, in Sartre's words, "non-egologically engaged in 
situation." I project myself into the mental and physi-
cal activities of the various characters in the story. 
I do not reflect upon the fact that 1^  am reading the 
book, nor upon the fact that I am sitting in this chair 
resting my elbows upon this table and supporting the 
weight of my head upon my palms. But I am "non-position-
ally" aware, which is to say that I would not, were I to 
break from my reading, be surprised to find myself in 
the position just described. I am "in touch" with my 
"self" as I read down the page. But I am not in touch 
with my ego. 
Now clearly, I am here and the book is there. But 
there is no intentional space between us. Consciousness 
has "escaped itself" into the object of its intention. 
So, too, when I "lose" myself while standing before an 
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exquisite painting. There is no positing of the rela-
tion "me and mine." I am, rather, engaged in lived 
immediate experience, having somehow reduced from my 
awareness any and all consideration for the "existent" 
painting or my "place" in the museum. But it is still 
my experience in the sense that £ live it. I am attend-
ing to the painting through an act of non-comparative 
appreciation, which is to say, I take the painting as 
the object of my intention and nothing else, as the 
painting that absorbs my attention. There is no attend-
ing to the physical as_ physical, no attending to the 
painting as better than or inferior to another. I have 
"removed" myself from the world of everyday experience 
and now stand in the clutches of non-reflective conscious-
ness descriptively penetrating the intentional objectivity 
whose smile has taken firm hold of my heart's fancy. But 
clearly I am still "oriented" in the sense that I am 
locked into fascination; and although there appears to be 
no "distinction" between the fascinating and the fasci-
nation, between the object of the intention and the 
actual living intention, each is certainly not the other; 
rather, each is in pure relation with the other, so there 
is no concern for, no attending to, the distinction. But 
does this mean that I am without a personality? Does my 
personality vanish, as Sartre would have us believe, when 
I step into a non-reflective "unconcernful" attitude? Or 
is there, as Husserl has so clearly suggested, something 
more intimately and indubitably "own" to me than the ego 
I manufacture in reflective acts? Am I a "grammatical 
' I , M o r a "transcendental I"? 
If we believe Sartre, then the irreducible founda-
tional structure of conscious experience is non-egolog-
ical, "prepersonal" consciousness. But if we accept the 
Husserlian concept of the "transcendental I," we find at 
the "core" of conscious experience a transcendental sub-
ject "directing" consciousness towards the world. This 
"subject" stands "in" consciousness and is that which 
engages immediate experience. For Sartre, consciousness 
alone is sufficient to engage immediate experience. In 
virtue of its own spontaneous upheaval, consciousness 
needs no "directing." It is directionality; or to use 
the Husserlian term, consciousness is intentionality. 
We must try first to see what Husserl has in mind, 
before passing on to a critique of Sartre's position. 
Husserl defines the activity of consciousness in 
terms of intentionality. "To be conscious," he writes, 
"is to be conscious ojf . . . something which then stands 
to the activity of consciousness as the meaning of its 
performance."! This "something" is not an "existent" 
object, but an "intentional objectivity."2 Such "objec-
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tivities" are meaning-entities "constituted" by conscious-
ness, and insofar as these entities are "intended," they 
appear and are grasped as_ objects precisely and only as 
they appear. 
Such activity of consciousness is an on-going process 
which would lack systematic unification were it not for 
the transcendental ego. If we reserve the term "evidence" 
to express the immediate grasping of its object by con-
sciousness, then we can gain some critical insight from 
the following passage taken from the Cartesian Medita-
tions t 
The ego is himself existent for himself 
in continuous evidence; thus, in himself, he 
is continuously constituting himself as exist-
ing. The ego grasps himself not only as a 
flowing life but also as 1^ , who live this and 
that subjective process, who live through this 
and that cogito, as_ the same 1_.3 
The subjective process to which Husserl refers is what 
we may now summarily describe as the constitution of 
intentional objectivities which appear as correlates to 
the directional gaze of consciousness. 
How am I to experience this? What process must I 
subject myself to in order that I might feel confident 
that I have as my irreducible foundation of conscious 
experience a transcendental or "pure" ego? 
I must first place out of consideration any and all 
concern for my place in the "natural attitude" by bracket-
ing from awareness the "taken-for-grantedness" which 
characterizes my involvement iti this attitude. I must 
confront the situation engaging me in terms of the mean-
ing it has for me in_ virtue of the specifics of the en-
gagement. Secondly, I must perform another recfuction, 
upon that which has been constituted and thereby opened 
up for descriptive penetration, namely the world as-it-
is-for-me, the "meaning-entity" world.^ This latter 
reduction reduces beyond the world of private meaning 
to what Husserl terms in his later period "living in-
tentionality." 5 In the performance of phenomenological 
reduction, everything "falls away" from consideration 
save the "transcendental I." This "I," as we have 
already noted, is engaged in "self-constitution"; it is 
an "egological life" composed solely of intentional 
activity. Gaston Berger remarks in his study of the Hus-
serlian cogito that after having put aside everything 
that has a sense, "we remain in the presence of that 
by which everything receives a sense: pure conscious-
ness, the ' I . * " 6 Husserl adds, in the Crisis, that 
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"having arrived at the ego, one becomes aware of stand-
ing within a sphere of self-evidence of such a nature 
that any attempt to inquire behind it would be absurd." 7 
And yet this sphere of self-evidence does not pre-
sent itself as something "apart" from me, as something 
which I can descriptively penetrate: it is a relation 
with myself, a relation of "ownness" and "identity" 
fused into a single crestation of lived experience which, 
in reflection, I will undoubtedly choose to call my own, 
but which, at this moment, stands as a relation of self-
constitution in its most irreducible form. It is a 
directed "ray" of intentionality so intense that no act 
of reflection can intercede. One has landed in the lap 
of his transcendental ego: 
(This) "being directed towards," the "being 
busied with," "adopting an attitude," "under-
going or suffering from," has this of necessity 
wrapped in its very essence: that IF is just 
something "from the Ego," or in the reverse 
direction "to the Ego"; and this is the pure 
Ego, and no reduction can get any grip on it.8 
This pure ego is not something that can stand over and 
against itself as an intentional objectivity: "It is 
in and for itself indescribable: pure ego and nothing 
further."9 
The transcendental ego, then, is in no significant 
way comparable to the psychological ego which Sartre 
would have us place "out in the world." The psychologi-
cal ego is given to itself through reflection as an "I," 
whereas the transcendental subject is given to itself in 
immediate experience as "living intentionality," as an 
"I" which has successfully bracketed from its awareness 
all attending to that which distinguishes it from the 
object of its intention. 1 0 It is, to be sure, an "I" 
without individuality. Writes Husserl in the Crisis: 
The "I" that I attain in the epoche . . . is 
actually called "I" only by equivocation—though 
it is an essential equivocation since, when I 
name it in reflection, I can say nothing other 
than: it is I who practice the epoche, I who 
interrogate, as phenomenon, the world which is 
now valid for me according to its being and 
being-such, with all its human beings, of whom 
I am so fully conscious; it is I who . . . am 
the ego-pole of this transcendental life, in 
which, at first, the world has meaning for me 
purely as world; it is I who, taken in full con-
creteness, encompass all t h a t . H 
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When conscious activity is reduced to the level of pure 
egohood, there is not consciousness of I-ness as there 
would be in the positing of the psychological ego. There 
is, in its place, reception-of-essence-as-meaningful.12 
We may suggest, then, that although it is not an "I" in 
the traditional sense, it is still clearly a "center of 
vision"13 directing intentional "rays" that constitute 
the very object of its fascination. It is, in this en-
gagement of immediacy, pure fascination.rT Only when 
disengaged from this lived immediacy may the pure ego 
reflect on its having been fascinated by that which it 
found fascinating. 1 5 But I never reflect on the precise 
engagement as-it-was-lived. I reflect on myself as an 
ego, but this" ego is not the continuous ego which is the 
precondition for my reflecting. The continuous ego is 
pure potential insofar as it is at all times non-apparent 
to consciousness as an ego, yet is nonetheless there-to-
be-re flee ted-on (IT only because it is there to engage 
lived experience). 
Summarily, we suggest that the transcendental ego 
solves a number of important problems for Husserl. It 
is, above all, the source of intentionality, being that 
which "directs" consciousness. Secondly, as the ground 
of intentional activity, it is the "unifier" of conscious 
experience. Thirdly, it is the phenomenon which accounts 
for why "non-reflective engagements in immediacy" are my 
experiences at the time of engagement. In turning now 
to a statement of Sartre's criticism, I ask that you 
bear in mind these three points, for they are the main 
tenets he attacks in his essay on "The Transcendence of 
the Ego." 
What Sartre wants most clearly to rule out is the 
unifying transcendental subject "inhabiting" conscious-
ness. 16 There is nothing "behind" each consciousness 
serving as the necessary structure of conscious activity 
simply because there is no content whatsoever "in" con-
sciousness. Indeed, putting something in consciousness 
with the power to unify makes consciousness thoroughly 
personal,17 when in fact consciousness is, as exhibited 
in non-reflective activity, absolutely impersonal con-
sciousness. If there is no consciousness of me chasing 
after a slow-moving streetcar, then there is only im-
personal consciousness of the-streetcar-needing-to-be-
caught. Hence, for, Sartre, the experience which is 
engagement in immediacy is really only "mine" in re-
flection, and is, when lived, merely lived engagement of 
consciousness unifying itself in the object it has escaped 
into. 
Hence, instead of the "transcendental I" serving as 
the a priori condition for there being intentional objec-
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tivities, it is Sartre's claim that consciousness as^ in-
tentionality "makes possible the unity and the personality 
of my I."IB 
From this, it follows that when the individual is 
engaged in immediacy, he is "plunged into the world of 
objects." He is not, however, staring in fascination at 
himself as his own intentional objectivity. The inten-
tional objectivity is by necessity outside of conscious-
ness , and for this reason alone, consciousness is able 
to both posit and grasp the object in the same act.19 
And simply because there is no "I" present in the en-
gagement, it is unequivocibly impersonal awareness most 
correctly interpreted not as "my_ consciousness of" but 
as "consciousness-of." It is only made my own experience 
when I reflect on having been lost in the object. 
Before offering a critique of this position, let's 
consider the following passage from Wolfe's Of_ Time and 
the River: 
He moved on ceaselessly across a naked and 
accursed landscape and beneath a naked and 
accursed sky, an exile in the centre of a 
planetary vacancy that, like his guilt and 
shame, had neither place among things living 
nor among things dead, in which there was 
, neither vengeance of lightening, nor mercy 
of burial, in which there was neither shade 
nor shelter, curve nor bend, nor hill, nor 
tree, nor hollow, in which—earth, air, sky, 
and limitless horizon—there was only one 
vast naked eye, inscrutable and accusing, 
from which there was no escape, and which 
bathed its naked soul in its fathomless 
depths of shame. 
And then the vision faded, and sud-
denly, with the bridgeless immediacy of a 
dream, he found himself within the narrow 
canyon of a street, pacing interminable 
along on endless pavements where there 
was neither face nor footfall save his 
own, nor eye, nor window, nor any door 
that he might enter. 2 0 
I want to show in my critique that such an example of 
non-reflective engagement in immediacy is "my" experience 
in the sense that "I" constitute myself not as the object 
of reflection, but as something I live.21 in the passage 
from Wolfe there is evidence of the very curious relation 
of non-egological consciousness as_ directed awareness. 
There is, specifically, "lived shame"—my shame in its 
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essential structure—and not merely "my" shame, but the 
shame which is, at this particular instant, me. True, 
I am, while engaged in "lived shame," not reflecting, 
and hence no "I" is presented to consciousness. But the 
"I" is only non-apparent: i_t is_ still there to be re-
flected on. As awareness momentarily without benefIt" of 
an "I," It is still awareness of that which is essential-
ly own to me at this precise moment, even if, at this 
moment of engagement, I am unable to posit any distinc-
tion between ownness and identity.22 The relation still 
has its two necessary components. There is still a dis-
tinction between the perceiver and the perceived. It's 
just that I do not consciously posit the distinction. 
My own position begins to take shape. I want to 
suggest that there is not a "personality" "behind" the 
irreducible foundation of consciousness insofar as I am 
unable, when engaged in immediate experience, to posit 
my relation to the intentional objectivity engaging my 
fascination. Yet there is still a fundamental "I-ness" 
which keeps me in relation with the object of my aware-
ness while yet not positing (through reflection) a re-
lation of "me and mine" or of extended supplantion in 
the world engaged by or engaging my awareness. 
Consider again the example which finds me stunned 
by the sheer beauty of a particular painting at a museum. 
I am standing, say, twenty paces from the canvas, but 
there is no intentional space separating us.23 i recog-
nize no conception of "otherness," and, likewise, no 
conception of "I-ness." I am staring with all the in-
tensity I can muster, holding open the shutter of my 
mental camera. And I might hold it open forever, if I 
did not somehow realize that I must "develop" the 
picture.24 indeed, consciousness is very much like a 
camera, insofar as it must "have its shutter closed" 
before it can (in reflection) constitute or "develop" 
the picture for future references. The interesting 
point to recognize here is that something compeIs con-
sciousness to close the shutter, something that is non-
reflectively aware of the entire situation in its un-
folding. It is a something which recognizes that if it 
does not withdraw from this engagement in immediacy there 
will be nothing from it to call its own; there will be no 
picture to share with friends, nothing to prove that it 
was there I This something is a transcendental subject 
in the sense in which we have interpreted Husserl. It 
is the psychological ego in its non-apparent, purely 
potential, state of being. It is, above all, the irre-
ducible ground of conscious experience. 
University of Colorado 
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Heidegger might suggest the following: there is 
not consciousness of I-ness solely because Dasein is 
"losing" itself in readiness-to-hand. Dasein is dis-
closing itself there for its here, but has not yet 
"acknowledged" its place "here" because it has not yet 
interpreted its concernful Being-towards in terms of 
what is (there) deseverantly ready-to-hand. Being and 
Time, Section 23. 
13 
Berger uses this terminology. 
^Indeed, pure fascination engaged by non-compara-
tive appreciation. 
i 5 I t is only when I reflect on my having been fasci-
nated that I may make judgements of comparative apprecia-
tion. 
1 6Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego: 
An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness, trans. Forrest 
Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Noonday, 1957), 
p. 41. 
1 7Ibid., p. 37. 
1 8Ibid., p. 40. 
1 9Ibid. , p. 41. 
20 
Thomas Wolfe, Of Time and the River: A Legend of 
Man's Hunger in His Youth (New York: Scribners, 1935) , 
p. 885~ (Compare with this "Sartrean" passage from 
Emerson's essay on "Nature": "Standing on the bare 
ground,—ray head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted 
into infinite space,—all mean egotism vanishes. I 
become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing [though] I 
see all.") 
21 
For Merleau-Ponty, the body is the ground of 
perception and can never be an "object" for my "self" 
since I can never get "outside" it (not even when stand-
ing before a mirror) . Phenomenology of Perception, 
trans. Colin Smith, rev. Forrest Wlliräms (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), particularly Chapter 3. 
22 
Heidegger seems to escape this problem through his 
characterization of "readiness-to-hand" and "presence-at-
hand." Yet he does not seem to sufficiently account for 
the "passage" from grasping something as ready-to-hand 
to the grasping of it as present-at-hand. What "prompts" 
this movement? 
23 
liiere is no intentional space, and yet I certainly 
recognize, with Merleau-Ponty, an expressive space between 
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myself and the painting. (This concept of space can 
also be derived from Heidegger's theory of "oriented" 
space.) 
24 
"Developing" the picture is commensurate to 
Heidegger's "second-order consciousness" and could be 
characterized in terms of the movement from readiness-
to-hand to presence-at-hand if there were included an 
analysis (akin to ours here) detailing the phenomenon 
instigating the transition from non-reflective to re-
flective awareness. Heidegger does make the comment 
that if the construction foreman never stopped studying 
the plans for a house, the house would never be built. 
But what prompts the foreman to grasp as present-at-
hand that which he previously grasped as ready-to-hand? 
